竞争说服理性疏忽的代理人
Competing to Persuade a Rationally Inattentive Agent
摘要:
公司战略性地披露产品信息,以吸引消费者,但接收者往往发现处理所有这些信息的成本很高,特别是当产品具有复杂的功能时。本文研究了一个由两个节点组成的竞争性信息披露模型,在这个模型中,接收者可以篡改发送者的实验,但代价是增加篡改的信息量。对于一个大类的参数,这是一个均衡的接收者提供的第一个最好的信息水平-即尽可能多的,她会学习,如果她自己控制的信息提供。关于一个发送者的信息取代了关于另一个发送者的信息,这使得单方面提供较少信息的利润率变得无效。因此,我们提供了一个新的渠道,通过注意力成本的竞争鼓励信息披露。
英文摘要:
Firms strategically disclose product information in order to attract consumers, but recipients often find it costly to process all of it, especially when products have complex features. We study a model of competitive information disclosure by two senders, in which the receiver may garble each sender's experiment, subject to a cost increasing in the informativeness of the garbling. For a large class of parameters, it is an equilibrium for the senders to provide the receiver's first best level of information - i.e. as much as she would learn if she herself controlled information provision. Information on one sender substitutes for information on the other, which nullifies the profitability of a unilateral provision of less information. Thus, we provide a novel channel through which competition with attention costs encourages information disclosure.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。