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arXiv 2511.09424econ.TH
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后验可分离成本与菜单偏好

Posterior-Separable Costs and Menu Preferences

FGV - São Paulo School of Economics(巴西圣保罗经济管理学院);Hebrew University of Jerusalem(耶路撒冷希伯来大学)

Henrique de Oliveira, Jeffrey Mensch

AI总结:

本文研究了在贝叶斯说服框架下,通过理性不注意偏好和无知等价性公理,实现后验可分离成本的唯一超平面求解方法。

摘要:

我们考虑一个具有理性不注意偏好过作用菜单的代理人,如de Oliveira等人(2017)所述。我们证明,两个公理,无关替代性和无知等价性,是该代理人具有满足轻微平滑条件的后验可分离成本的必要且充分条件,该条件称为联合方向可微性。将决策者的问题视为贝叶斯说服问题,我们还证明这些公理是通过唯一超平面求解的必要且充分条件。当成本函数对不同的先验保持不变时,我们证明这些公理导致均匀后验可分离成本,这些成本是可微的。

英文摘要:

We consider an agent with a rationally inattentive preference over menus of acts, as in de Oliveira et al (2017). We show that two axioms, Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives and Ignorance Equivalence, are necessary and sufficient for this agent to have a posterior-separable cost satisfying a mild smoothness condition, called joint-directional differentiability. Viewing the decision-maker's problem as a Bayesian persuasion problem, we also show that these axioms are necessary and sufficient for solvability by a unique hyperplane. When the cost function remains invariant for different priors, we show that these axioms imply uniformly posterior separable costs that are differentiable.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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