arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 2005.07267econ.THcs.GTcs.SYeess.SY
收藏

动态信息设计

Dynamic information design

Deepanshu Vasal

摘要:

我们考虑一个发送方和一个接收方的动态信息设计问题,其中发送方观察系统的私有状态,并根据其观察结果向接收方发送信号。根据这个信号,接收者采取行动,确定发送者和接收者的奖励,并控制系统的状态。在这篇技术笔记中,我们证明了这个问题可以被认为是一个不对称信息的动态博弈问题,它的完美贝叶斯均衡(PBE)和Stackelberg均衡(SE)可以使用同一作者(以及其他人)在[1],[2]中提出的算法进行分析。然后,我们扩展这个模型时,有一个发送者和多个接收者,并提供算法来计算一类均衡的这个游戏。

英文摘要:

We consider the problem of dynamic information design with one sender and one receiver where the sender observers a private state of the system and takes an action to send a signal based on its observation to a receiver. Based on this signal, the receiver takes an action that determines rewards for both the sender and the receiver and controls the state of the system. In this technical note, we show that this problem can be considered as a problem of dynamic game of asymmetric information and its perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) and Stackelberg equilibrium (SE) can be analyzed using the algorithms presented in [1], [2] by the same author (among others). We then extend this model when there is one sender and multiple receivers and provide algorithms to compute a class of equilibria of this game.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

↑