国家推动的产业改革投资:一种信息设计方法
State-Promoted Investment for Industrial Reforms: an Information Design Approach
摘要:
本文分析了信息摩擦下政府推进大型投资项目的最优策略。具体来说,我们提出了一个模型,政府收集每项投资的概率信息,并将其披露给私人投资者,如Kamenica和Gentzkow(2011)。我们推导出政府的最优信息政策,其特征在于作为阈值的未知概率的项目发布给私人投资者,并研究如何经济的基本特征影响的最优政策。我们发现,当有多个项目时,政府只有在其概率相当高的情况下,才通过充分揭示经济的真实状况来推动具有更大溢出效应的项目。此外,金融/信息市场的发展也影响最优规则。
英文摘要:
We analyze the optimal strategy for a government to promote large-scale investment projects under information frictions. Specifically, we propose a model where the government collects information on probability of each investment and discloses it to private investors a la Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011). We derive the government's optimal information policy, which is characterized as threshold values for the unknown probability of the projects released to the private investors, and study how the underlying features of the economy affect the optimal policies. We find that when multiple projects are available, the government promotes the project with a bigger spillover effect by fully revealing the true state of the economy only when its probability is substantially high. Moreover, the development of the financial/information market also affects the optimal rule.
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