信息获取中的责任设计
Liability Design with Information Acquisition
摘要：
如何保证公司在推出具有潜在危险的产品之前进行尽职调查？我们研究的责任规则的设计时，（一）有限责任防止公司从内部的全部损害，他们可能会造成，（二）罚款只支付损害发生时，无论产品的内在风险，（三）公司有私人信息关于他们的产品的风险之前，进行尽职调查。我们表明，（i）任何责任机制都可以通过关税来实施，该关税仅取决于公司在发生损害时获得的证据，而不是公司关于其私人信息的任何初始报告，（ii）在产品风险之前分配较高的公司总是会执行更多的尽职调查，但低于社会最佳水平，以及（iii）在简单直观的条件下，任何类型特定的发射阈值都可以通过单调费率来实现。
英文摘要：
How to guarantee that firms perform due diligence before launching potentially dangerous products? We study the design of liability rules when (i) limited liability prevents firms from internalizing the full damage they may cause, (ii) penalties are paid only if damage occurs, regardless of the product's inherent riskiness, (iii) firms have private information about their products' riskiness before performing due diligence. We show that (i) any liability mechanism can be implemented by a tariff that depends only on the evidence acquired by the firm if a damage occurs, not on any initial report by the firm about its private information, (ii) firms that assign a higher prior to product riskiness always perform more due diligence but less than is socially optimal, and (iii) under a simple and intuitive condition, any type-specific launch thresholds can be implemented by a monotonic tariff.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
