有限责任无先验动态机制设计
Prior-free Dynamic Mechanism Design With Limited Liability
摘要：
我们研究的问题，反复拍卖一个项目之一的$k$投标人：a）投标人有一个每轮的个人理性约束，b）投标人可以离开的机制在任何时候，和c）投标人的估价是对立的选择（无先验设置）。如果没有这些限制，拍卖师可以运行第二价格拍卖来“出售业务”，并获得整个项目流的第二高总价值。我们表明，在这些约束下，拍卖商可以达到一个恒定的分数的“出售业务”的基准，但不超过$2/e$这个基准。在这个过程中，我们设计了一个独立利益的单一投标人问题的机制：如果你知道他们在所有回合的总价值是$V$，但不知道他们的价值如何随着时间的推移而变化，你应该如何重复地向一个具有对抗性估值的（每轮IR）买家出售一件物品？我们展示了一种机制，实现收入$V/e$，并表明这是紧。
英文摘要：
We study the problem of repeatedly auctioning off an item to one of $k$ bidders where: a) bidders have a per-round individual rationality constraint, b) bidders may leave the mechanism at any point, and c) the bidders' valuations are adversarially chosen (the prior-free setting). Without these constraints, the auctioneer can run a second-price auction to "sell the business" and receive the second highest total value for the entire stream of items. We show that under these constraints, the auctioneer can attain a constant fraction of the "sell the business" benchmark, but no more than $2/e$ of this benchmark. In the course of doing so, we design mechanisms for a single bidder problem of independent interest: how should you repeatedly sell an item to a (per-round IR) buyer with adversarial valuations if you know their total value over all rounds is $V$ but not how their value changes over time? We demonstrate a mechanism that achieves revenue $V/e$ and show that this is tight.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
