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arXiv 2103.03911econ.TH
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获取信息的合同

Contracts for acquiring information

Aubrey Clark, Giovanni Reggiani

摘要:

本文研究了信息获取的激励措施。代理人获取信息的成本很高,而且委托人无法观察到信息。我们表明,任何帕累托最优合同分解成一小部分的输出,状态依赖的转移,和最佳失真。在此分解下:1)在代理可用的实验集合中,支付的输出的比例增加,2)状态依赖转移指数合同支付以考虑状态之间的输出差异,3)最优失真利用信息获取成本的互补性:实验概率通过与责任限制相一致的合同付款而不可改变,被取代,根据信息获取成本的互补性发生的替代,以及4)当且仅当代理的实验成本是互信息时,最佳失真采取决策相关转移的形式。

英文摘要:

This paper studies the provision of incentives for information acquisition. Information is costly for an agent to acquire and unobservable to a principal. We show that any Pareto optimal contract has a decomposition into a fraction of output, a state-dependent transfer, and an optimal distortion. Under this decomposition: 1) the fraction of output paid is increasing in the set of experiments available to the agent, 2) the state-dependent transfer indexes contract payments to account for differences in output between states, 3) the optimal distortion exploits complementarities in the cost of information acquisition: experiment probabilities unalterable via contract payments stuck against liability limits are substituted for, the substitution occurring according to complementarities in the cost of information acquisition, and 4) if and only if the agent's cost of experimentation is mutual information, the optimal distortion takes the form of a decision-dependent transfer.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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