私人信息获取与抢占:一个策略Wald问题
Private Information Acquisition and Preemption: a Strategic Wald Problem
摘要:
研究了一个具有支付外部性的动态信息获取模型。两个玩家在采取安全或冒险的行动之前,可以获得关于未知状态的昂贵信息。信息和采取的行动都是私人的。第一个采取冒险行动的参与者有优势,但冒险行动是否有利可图取决于状态。球员们面临着第一和正确之间的权衡。在均衡中,对于不同的先验,存在三种随机化:当参与者悲观时,他们随机进入竞争;当参与者不那么悲观时,他们获得信息然后随机停止;当参与者相对乐观时,他们随机采取行动而不获得信息。
英文摘要:
This paper studies a dynamic information acquisition model with payoff externalities. Two players can acquire costly information about an unknown state before taking a safe or risky action. Both information and the action taken are private. The first player to take the risky action has an advantage but whether the risky action is profitable depends on the state. The players face the tradeoff between being first and being right. In equilibrium, for different priors, there exist three kinds of randomisation: when the players are pessimistic, they enter the competition randomly; when the players are less pessimistic, they acquire information and then randomly stop; when the players are relatively optimistic, they randomly take an action without acquiring information.
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