无知条件下战略互动中的乐观与悲观
Optimism and Pessimism in Strategic Interactions under Ignorance
摘要:
我们研究的是在无知之幕下互动的玩家,他们的信念被粗糙地表示为对手行动的子集。我们分析这些球员遵循$\max \min$或$\max\max$决策标准,我们确定悲观或乐观的态度,分别。解释正式这些态度和球员的原因如何互动无知下,我们的行为特征的影响,共同相信在这些事件:而乐观的是与点的可量化性,一个新的算法-沃尔德可量化性-捕捉悲观。我们的表征使我们能够发现新的结果:($i$)关于乐观,我们将其与Yildiz(2007)的一厢情愿联系起来,我们证明了放弃(隐含的)“信念隐含真理”假设推翻了其中描述的存在失败;($ii$)我们阐明了序数博弈中的理性概念;($iii$)我们澄清了Weinstein(2016)分析中暗示的可验证性不连续性背后的概念基础。
英文摘要:
We study players interacting under the veil of ignorance, who have -- coarse -- beliefs represented as subsets of opponents' actions. We analyze when these players follow $\max \min$ or $\max\max$ decision criteria, which we identify with pessimistic or optimistic attitudes, respectively. Explicitly formalizing these attitudes and how players reason interactively under ignorance, we characterize the behavioral implications related to common belief in these events: while optimism is related to Point Rationalizability, a new algorithm -- Wald Rationalizability -- captures pessimism. Our characterizations allow us to uncover novel results: ($i$) regarding optimism, we relate it to wishful thinking á la Yildiz (2007) and we prove that dropping the (implicit) "belief-implies-truth" assumption reverses an existence failure described therein; ($ii$) we shed light on the notion of rationality in ordinal games; ($iii$) we clarify the conceptual underpinnings behind a discontinuity in Rationalizability hinted in the analysis of Weinstein (2016).
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