arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 2209.01146cs.GTecon.TH
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广义委托-代理:契约、信息、博弈及其他

Generalized Principal-Agency: Contracts, Information, Games and Beyond

Jiarui Gan, Minbiao Han, Jibang Wu, Haifeng Xu

AI总结:

本文将 Myerson 的委托-代理模型扩展至无限行动空间与设计约束的广义设定,统一了契约设计、信息设计和 Bayesian Stackelberg 博弈,推导出多项式时间最优机制算法,并揭示了受约束设计问题的 APX-hard 复杂度及与信息获取的联系。

摘要:

在 Myerson'82 提出的委托-代理问题中,代理拥有私人信息(类型)并做出私人决策(行动),两者对委托人而言均不可观测。Myerson 指出了一种依赖于显示原理的优雅线性规划解法。本文将 Myerson 的结果扩展至更一般的设定,其中委托人的行动空间可以是无限的,并受制于额外的设计约束。我们的广义委托-代理模型统一了若干重要的设计问题,包括契约设计、信息设计和 Bayesian Stackelberg 博弈,并将它们作为特例涵盖其中。我们首先将显示原理扩展至该一般模型,基于此推导出一个多项式时间算法,用于计算委托人的最优机制。该算法不仅为上述所有特例同时蕴含了新的高效解法,还显著简化了为特例设计的已知算法。受近期对单一契约及契约菜单算法设计关注的启发,我们将此类受约束的设计问题引入到我们的广义委托-代理模型中。与上述统一性相反,我们在此的结果说明了不同委托-代理设计问题之间多样性的另一面,并展示了它们不同的结构如何导致不同的复杂度:部分问题是易处理的,而其他则是 APX-hard。最后,我们揭示了我们的模型与决策制定的信息获取问题之间的有趣联系,并总体上研究了其算法性质。

英文摘要:

In the principal-agent problem formulated by Myerson'82, agents have private information (type) and make private decisions (action), both of which are unobservable to the principal. Myerson pointed out an elegant linear programming solution that relies on the revelation principle. This paper extends Myerson's results to a more general setting where the principal's action space can be infinite and subject to additional design constraints. Our generalized principal-agent model unifies several important design problems including contract design, information design, and Bayesian Stackelberg games, and encompasses them as special cases. We first extend the revelation principle to this general model, based on which a polynomial-time algorithm is then derived for computing the optimal mechanism for the principal. This algorithm not only implies new efficient solutions simultaneously for all the aforementioned special cases but also significantly simplifies previously known algorithms designed for special cases. Inspired by the recent interest in the algorithmic design of a single contract and menu of contracts, we study such constrained design problems to our general principal-agent model. In contrast to the above unification, our results here illustrate the other facet of diversity among different principal-agent design problems and demonstrate how their different structures can lead to different complexities: some are tractable whereas others are APX-hard. Finally, we reveal an interesting connection of our model to the problem of information acquisition for decision making and study its algorithmic properties in general.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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