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arXiv 2311.02537cs.GTecon.TH
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带安全检查的契约设计

Contract Design With Safety Inspections

Alireza Fallah, Michael I. Jordan

AI总结:

该研究针对带安全检查的契约设计问题,刻画了单代理人场景下的最优线性契约,提出多代理人场景下基于动态规划的检查预算近似最优分配方法,并通过案例揭示检查成本差异对预算分配的显著影响。

摘要:

我们研究监管检查在契约设计问题中的作用,该问题中委托人分别与多个代理人互动。每个代理人的隐藏行动包含一个维度,该维度决定他们是否会采取额外的高成本步骤来遵守安全规程。委托人的目标是将报酬与有限预算下的随机检查相结合,激励代理人采取符合安全规范的行动,从而最大化委托人的效用。我们首先聚焦于带线性契约的单代理人场景,提出了一种高效算法来刻画最优线性契约,该契约同时包含报酬和随机检查机制。我们进一步探究了最优契约如何随检查成本或安全规程遵守成本的变化而调整。值得注意的是,我们证明当上述任意一种成本上升时,代理人的报酬都会增加。然而,尽管检查概率会随着检查成本的上升而下降,但它作为安全行动成本的函数却表现出非单调行为。最后,我们探讨了多代理人场景,此时委托人面临的挑战是确定检查预算在所有代理人之间的最优分配方式。我们提出了一种基于动态规划的高效方法,用于找到各契约间检查预算的近似最优分配方案。我们还设计了一种随机序贯方案来确定检查员的任务分配,确保每个代理人最多被检查一次,且检查概率符合预期。最后,我们通过案例研究表明,不同代理人之间仅检查成本的差异,就可能促使委托人决定放弃对相当大比例代理人的检查,而将全部预算集中在那些检查成本更低的代理人身上。

英文摘要:

We study the role of regulatory inspections in a contract design problem in which a principal interacts separately with multiple agents. Each agent's hidden action includes a dimension that determines whether they undertake an extra costly step to adhere to safety protocols. The principal's objective is to use payments combined with a limited budget for random inspections to incentivize agents towards safety-compliant actions that maximize the principal's utility. We first focus on the single-agent setting with linear contracts and present an efficient algorithm that characterizes the optimal linear contract, which includes both payment and random inspection. We further investigate how the optimal contract changes as the inspection cost or the cost of adhering to safety protocols vary. Notably, we demonstrate that the agent's compensation increases if either of these costs escalates. However, while the probability of inspection decreases with rising inspection costs, it demonstrates nonmonotonic behavior as a function of the safety action costs. Lastly, we explore the multi-agent setting, where the principal's challenge is to determine the best distribution of inspection budgets among all agents. We propose an efficient approach based on dynamic programming to find an approximately optimal allocation of inspection budget across contracts. We also design a random sequential scheme to determine the inspector's assignments, ensuring each agent is inspected at most once and at the desired probability. Finally, we present a case study illustrating that a mere difference in the cost of inspection across various agents can drive the principal's decision to forego inspecting a significant fraction of them, concentrating its entire budget on those that are less costly to inspect.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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