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arXiv 1404.7239cs.GT
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合同专家与未知的成本结构

Contracting Experts With Unknown Cost Structures

Mark Braverman, Gal Oshri

摘要:

我们调查的问题,主要期待合同的专家提供一个分类事件的概率预测。我们假设所有专家对事件的概率都有一个共同的公众先验,但可以通过参与研究形成更准确的意见。各种专家的研究费用是校长不知道的。针对委托人聘请专家的问题,提出了一种真实有效的解决机制。这导致委托人与最好的专家签约来做这项工作,而委托人的预期效用相当于拥有第二好的专家。我们的机制将评分规则与拍卖联系起来,这种联系在获得新信息需要昂贵的研究时非常有用。

英文摘要:

We investigate the problem of a principal looking to contract an expert to provide a probability forecast for a categorical event. We assume all experts have a common public prior on the event's probability, but can form more accurate opinions by engaging in research. Various experts' research costs are unknown to the principal. We present a truthful and efficient mechanism for the principal's problem of contracting an expert. This results in the principal contracting the best expert to do the work, and the principal's expected utility is equivalent to having the second best expert in-house. Our mechanism connects scoring rules with auctions, a connection that is useful when obtaining new information requires costly research.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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