arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv周末暂无论文更新,休息一下吧,周末愉快~~
arXiv 2109.14260cs.GT
收藏

组合契约

Combinatorial Contracts

Paul Duetting, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Thomas Kesselheim

AI总结:

本文提出组合契约模型,刻画代理人选择不可观测行动子集时的激励问题,证明 gross substitutes 下可通过多项式价值查询求最优契约,而次模情形为 NP 难。

摘要:

我们引入了一种新的组合契约模型,其中委托人将一项有成本任务的执行委托给代理人。为了完成任务,代理人可以从给定的不可观测行动集合中选择任意子集,每个行动都有相应成本。一个行动集合的成本是其中各单独行动成本之和,而委托人的收益作为所选行动的函数满足某种形式的收益递减。委托人根据观测到的结果,通过一份契约来激励代理人。我们的主要结果针对委托给代理人的任务是一个可能成功或失败的项目这一情形。我们证明,如果作为行动集合函数的成功概率满足 gross substitutes(总替代)性质,那么最优契约可以用多项式次数的价值查询计算;而如果它是次模函数,则最优契约是 NP 难的。我们的所有结果都可扩展到更高维结果空间的线性契约,并证明在一阶矩约束下这类线性契约具有稳健最优性。我们的分析揭示了 gross substitutes 函数的一个新性质,并展现了组合契约与组合拍卖之间许多有趣的联系;在组合拍卖中,gross substitutes 已知是高效计算的前沿边界。

英文摘要:

We introduce a new model of combinatorial contracts in which a principal delegates the execution of a costly task to an agent. To complete the task, the agent can take any subset of a given set of unobservable actions, each of which has an associated cost. The cost of a set of actions is the sum of the costs of the individual actions, and the principal's reward as a function of the chosen actions satisfies some form of diminishing returns. The principal incentivizes the agents through a contract, based on the observed outcome. Our main results are for the case where the task delegated to the agent is a project, which can be successful or not. We show that if the success probability as a function of the set of actions is gross substitutes, then an optimal contract can be computed with polynomially many value queries, whereas if it is submodular, the optimal contract is NP-hard. All our results extend to linear contracts for higher-dimensional outcome spaces, which we show to be robustly optimal given first moment constraints. Our analysis uncovers a new property of gross substitutes functions, and reveals many interesting connections between combinatorial contracts and combinatorial auctions, where gross substitutes is known to be the frontier for efficient computation.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

↑