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arXiv 2402.13824cs.GT
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超越二元行动的多智能体合同设计

Multi-Agent Contract Design beyond Binary Actions

Federico Cacciamani, Martino Bernasconi, Matteo Castiglioni, Nicola Gatti

AI总结:

本文研究多智能体隐藏行动问题,提出确定性机制和随机化机制两类合同设计方法,将单智能体合同自然扩展到任意行动和任意结果分布的一般设定。

摘要:

我们研究具有多个智能体的隐藏行动委托-代理问题。与以往工作不同,我们考虑一个一般性设定,其中每个智能体拥有任意数量的行动,联合行动根据任意分布诱导结果。我们研究两类机制:一类是确定性机制,它是单智能体合同的自然扩展,其中智能体在合同诱导的博弈中达到纳什均衡;另一类是随机化机制,其灵感来源于单智能体随机合同与相关均衡。

英文摘要:

We study hidden-action principal-agent problems with multiple agents. Unlike previous work, we consider a general setting in which each agent has an arbitrary number of actions, and the joint action induces outcomes according to an arbitrary distribution. We study two classes of mechanisms: a class of deterministic mechanisms that is the natural extension of single-agent contracts, in which the agents play a Nash equilibrium of the game induced by the contract, and a class of randomized mechanisms that is inspired by single-agent randomized contracts and correlated equilibria.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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