arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 2106.00319cs.GT
收藏

贝叶斯代理:线性合同与可处理合同

Bayesian Agency: Linear versus Tractable Contracts

Matteo Castiglioni, Alberto Marchesi, Nicola Gatti

摘要:

我们研究委托代理问题,其中委托人承诺一个结果依赖的支付计划(a.k.a.合同),以诱导代理人采取昂贵的,不可观察的行动。我们放松的假设,委托人完全知道代理人考虑贝叶斯设置代理人的类型是未知的,随机选择根据一个给定的概率分布,这是已知的委托人。每个代理人的类型的特点是她自己的行动成本和行动结果分布。在非贝叶斯委托代理问题的文献中,相当多的注意力都集中在线性合同上,线性合同是简单的,纯佣金支付计划,仍然提供了很好的近似保证,相对于委托最优(可能是非线性)合同。虽然在非贝叶斯设置的最优合同可以有效地计算,这不再是我们的贝叶斯委托代理问题的情况。这进一步激发了我们对线性合约的关注,鉴于其单参数性质,线性合约可以有效地优化。我们的目标是分析贝叶斯设置中线性合同的属性,在最优合同和一般易处理合同(即,有效的计算)。首先,我们研究了线性契约关于最优契约的近似保证,证明了线性契约的近似保证具有与代理类型数成线性关系的乘法损失。尽管如此,我们证明了线性合同仍然可以提供一个常数乘法近似$ρ$的最佳主的预期效用,虽然在一个指数小的附加损失$2^{-Ω(ρ)}$的代价。然后,我们切换到易处理的合同,令人惊讶的是,线性合同在其中表现良好。

英文摘要:

We study principal-agent problems in which a principal commits to an outcome-dependent payment scheme (a.k.a. contract) so as to induce an agent to take a costly, unobservable action. We relax the assumption that the principal perfectly knows the agent by considering a Bayesian setting where the agent's type is unknown and randomly selected according to a given probability distribution, which is known to the principal. Each agent's type is characterized by her own action costs and action-outcome distributions. In the literature on non-Bayesian principal-agent problems, considerable attention has been devoted to linear contracts, which are simple, pure-commission payment schemes that still provide nice approximation guarantees with respect to principal-optimal (possibly non-linear) contracts. While in non-Bayesian settings an optimal contract can be computed efficiently, this is no longer the case for our Bayesian principal-agent problems. This further motivates our focus on linear contracts, which can be optimized efficiently given their single-parameter nature. Our goal is to analyze the properties of linear contracts in Bayesian settings, in terms of approximation guarantees with respect to optimal contracts and general tractable contracts (i.e., efficiently-computable ones). First, we study the approximation guarantees of linear contracts with respect to optimal ones, showing that the former suffer from a multiplicative loss linear in the number of agent's types. Nevertheless, we prove that linear contracts can still provide a constant multiplicative approximation $ρ$ of the optimal principal's expected utility, though at the expense of an exponentially-small additive loss $2^{-Ω(ρ)}$. Then, we switch to tractable contracts, showing that, surprisingly, linear contracts perform well among them.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

↑