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arXiv 2007.05983econ.TH
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持久性信息的承包

Contracting over persistent information

Wei Zhao, Claudio Mezzetti, Ludovic Renou, Tristan Tomala

摘要:

我们考虑一个动态的道德风险问题之间的委托人和代理人,其中唯一的工具,委托人激励代理人是信息披露。委托人的目标是最大化代理选择特定动作的(折扣)次数,例如,努力工作我们发现,存在一个最优的合同,在那里的主要停止披露信息,尽快其最喜欢的行动是一个静态的最佳答复的代理人或继续披露信息,直到代理人完美地学习到主要的私人信息。如果智能体完美地学习了状态,他在有限时间内学习的概率为1;智能体越有耐心,他学习的时间就越晚。

英文摘要:

We consider a dynamic moral hazard problem between a principal and an agent, where the sole instrument the principal has to incentivize the agent is the disclosure of information. The principal aims at maximizing the (discounted) number of times the agent chooses a particular action, e.g., to work hard. We show that there exists an optimal contract, where the principal stops disclosing information as soon as its most preferred action is a static best reply for the agent or else continues disclosing information until the agent perfectly learns the principal's private information. If the agent perfectly learns the state, he learns it in finite time with probability one; the more patient the agent, the later he learns it.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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