信息契约：异质性成本与投资机会
Contracting for Information: Heterogeneous Costs and Investment Opportunities
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中文总结 AI 辅助
本文研究委托人如何与拥有私人信息成本的研究者签订信息获取契约，将问题转化为带成本约束的信息设计，发现委托人从不过度投资但可能投资不足，且投资机会越好，诱导投资的成本临界值越高。
中文摘要 AI 辅助
委托人面临一个不确定性下的决策问题，可以与研究者签订契约以获取相关信息。获取信息的成本只有研究者自己知道，而且，通过私下进行投资，研究者可以降低其预期成本。我们证明，这一契约问题可以视为一个带有成本约束的信息设计问题，并利用该文献中的技术来求解最优契约。委托人从不过度投资，但即使投资是有效的，也可能投资不足。我们建立了投资成本的临界值，低于该临界值时委托人会诱导投资，并证明对于更好的投资机会，该临界值更高，其含义是投资后成本分布在单调似然比序下有所改善。
英文摘要
A principal faces a decision problem under uncertainty and can contract with a researcher to provide relevant information. The cost of acquiring information is only known to the researcher, and, moreover, by privately making an investment the researcher can reduce their expected cost. We characterize optimal contracts by reducing the problem to information design with cost constraints. The principal induces investment below a cutoff in its sunk cost. With two cost types, investment may be underprovided but is never excessive relative to the first best. With more types, the cutoff property survives but overinvestment can occur. Investment incentives also reshape information acquisition: optimal experiments may need to generate more distinct beliefs than there are possible states, and their design can be sensitive to the principal's initial beliefs.
发表机构
- University of California, Riverside（加州大学河滨分校）
机构由 AI 辅助整理，请以论文原文为准。
