隐藏的承诺力是无力的
Hidden Commitment Power Is Powerless
AI总结:
本文研究委托人拥有私人承诺力信息时的契约设计问题,发现所有类型的委托人都表现得如同其承诺力最低,因此隐藏的承诺力没有实际影响。
摘要:
提供契约的委托人可能会在其默认选项足够有吸引力时违约。这种诱惑的大小衡量了她的承诺力,且通常是她的私人信息。本文探讨在这种信息不对称下契约结果如何变化。通过直觉准则约束非均衡路径信念,我发现每种类型的委托人的行为和收益都完全等同于她被普遍认为拥有最小承诺力的情况。因此,隐藏的承诺力是无力的。这一结果提供了一个明确的政策启示:如何缓解契约前的这种信息不对称——只有改善最坏情况的措施才有价值。应用于信用评级,它合理化了实践中广泛使用的单调分割结构。
英文摘要:
A principal who offers a contract may renege when her default option is sufficiently attractive. The size of this temptation, which inversely measures her commitment power, is often the principal's private information. This paper asks how contracting outcomes change under this information asymmetry. Disciplining off-path beliefs with the Intuitive Criterion, I find that every type of principal behaves and earns payoffs as if she were commonly known to have the least commitment power. Hidden commitment power is therefore powerless, although commitment power can be valuable under symmetric information. The result delivers an unambiguous policy lesson on how to mitigate this information asymmetry prior to contracting: only measures that improve the worst case have value. In an application to credit rating, when the cost of a rating system grows with its number of grades, a rating system that sorts issuers into ordered bands is optimal, and each issuer contracts on the terms warranted by the floor of her band.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。