动机隐匿的顾问
Advisors with Hidden Motives
AI总结：
本文构建动机隐匿的卖方顾问模型，刻画其引导销量转向高利润产品的最优披露规则，发现强制透明政策会削弱卖方披露乃至获取物品价值信息的动力，为咨询市场监管提供新的理论参考。
摘要：
本文研究了一类动机隐匿的顾问模型：卖方向潜在买方披露物品价值相关信息，而买方既不知道物品价值，也不清楚售出该物品对卖方的利润有多高（即卖方的动机）。笔者刻画了卖方用于将销量从低利润物品转向高利润物品的最优披露规则。本文考察了强制透明政策的效果，该政策会向买方披露卖方的动机。研究表明，通过消除卖方的转向激励，透明政策可能会打消卖方披露物品价值信息的念头，甚至会让卖方从一开始就不去获取这类信息。该结果完善了我们对咨询市场有效监管的理解，并将其与顾问-被顾问关系中的承诺协议相关联。
英文摘要：
I study a model of advisors with hidden motives: a seller discloses information about an object's value to a potential buyer, who doesn't know the object's value or how profitable the object's sale is to the seller (the seller's motives). I characterize optimal disclosure rules, used by the seller to steer sales from lower- to higher-profitability objects. I investigate the effects of a mandated transparency policy, which reveals the seller's motives to the buyer. I show that, by removing the seller's steering incentive, transparency can dissuade the seller from disclosing information about the object's value, and from acquiring that information in the first place. This result refines our understanding of effective regulation in advice markets, and links it to the commitment protocol in the advisor-advisee relation.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
