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arXiv 2405.04468econ.TH
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转动棘轮:多智能体动态甄别

Turning the Ratchet: Dynamic Screening with Multiple Agents

Mehmet Ekmekci, Lucas Maestri, Dong Wei

AI总结:

针对多智能体有限承诺下的动态契约甄别问题,推导了促进信息披露的充要条件,发现耐心参与者的私人信息要么永不披露要么顺序全披露,且最优契约的信息披露激励随时间递减。

摘要:

我们研究了一个存在多智能体与有限承诺的动态契约问题。委托人试图通过单期契约甄别高效智能体,但在获知智能体类型后会有修改契约条款的动机。契约的变更可被观测,因此一旦违背过往承诺,未来的信息披露就会停止。我们给出了能够促进信息披露的充要条件。对于足够有耐心的参与者,私人信息要么永不披露,要么以顺序方式完全披露。最优契约在智能体首次披露类型时提供强激励,且信息披露的奖励会随时间推移逐渐消失。

英文摘要:

We study a dynamic contracting problem with multiple agents and limited commitment. A principal seeks to screen efficient agents using one-period contracts, but is tempted to revise contract terms upon knowing an agent's type. Alterations of contracts are observable and, hence, whenever past promises are broken future information revelation stops. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions under which information revelation can be fostered. For sufficiently patient players, private information is either never revealed or fully revealed in a sequential manner. Optimal contracts provide high-powered incentives upon initial disclosure of an agent's type, and rewards for information revelation vanish over time.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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