利用匿名信息在社交网络中定位
Targeting in social networks with anonymized information
摘要：
本文研究了一个只有网络拓扑信息的规划者是否可以根据网络位置来区分智能体。规划者提出一个简单的合同菜单，每个地点一个，以最大化总福利，代理人在菜单中选择。这一机制不受单个代理人的偏差影响，如果排除了侧向支付，也不受规模为2、3和4的代理人群体的偏差影响。然而，如果补偿是允许的，代理人组可能有动机共同偏离最优合同，以利用其他代理人。我们确定的网络拓扑结构的最佳合同是组激励兼容的转让：无向网络和定期定向树，网络拓扑结构的规划者必须分配统一的数量：单根和嵌套的邻居有向网络。
英文摘要：
This paper studies whether a planner who only has information about the network topology can discriminate among agents according to their network position. The planner proposes a simple menu of contracts, one for each location, in order to maximize total welfare, and agents choose among the menu. This mechanism is immune to deviations by single agents, and to deviations by groups of agents of sizes 2, 3 and 4 if side-payments are ruled out. However, if compensations are allowed, groups of agents may have an incentive to jointly deviate from the optimal contract in order to exploit other agents. We identify network topologies for which the optimal contract is group incentive compatible with transfers: undirected networks and regular oriented trees, and network topologies for which the planner must assign uniform quantities: single root and nested neighborhoods directed networks.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
