机制设计中关于其他参与者的信息
Information About Other Players in Mechanism Design
AI总结:
本文研究机制设计中,规划者关注代理人接收关于其他代理人类型的噪声信号,证明额外信息可消除不良均衡,有助于完全实施,并提供充分条件使不可完全实施的社会选择函数变为可完全实施。
摘要:
我们研究规划者关注代理人接收关于其他代理人类型的噪声信号的机制设计设置。我们表明,关于其他代理人的额外信息可以消除不期望的均衡,从而对致力于完全实施的规划者有所帮助,即设计一种机制,使得每个均衡结果都是期望的。我们提供了一个充分条件,在该条件下,当代理人没有关于其他代理人类型的信息时不可完全实施的社会选择函数,在代理人拥有额外信息时可以变得完全可实施。
英文摘要:
We study mechanism design settings where the planner has an interest in agents receiving noisy signals about the types of other agents. We show that additional information about other agents can eliminate undesired equilibria, making it helpful to a planner interested in full implementation, designing a mechanism for which every equilibrium outcome is desirable. We provide a sufficient condition under which a social choice function that is not fully implementable when agents have no information about types of other agents can become fully implementable when agents have additional information.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。