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arXiv 2210.08328econ.TH
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具有不确定性的群体公共品博弈

A Group Public Goods Game with Position Uncertainty

Chowdhury Mohammad Sakib Anwar, Jorge Bruno, Sonali SenGupta

摘要:

我们建立了一个动态的公共品贡献博弈模型,在这个模型中,玩家(自然地)分成不同的群体。这些组是外生地放置在一个序列中,玩家可以获得关于其组在序列中的位置的有限信息。参与人同时独立地做出贡献决策,群体的总贡献是顺序做出的。我们试图捕捉组间和组内的行为,并分析不同的情况下,球员观察他们的前任群体的总贡献的部分历史。在这个框架下,我们表明,即使当玩家观察到的背叛(无贡献)的历史,合作的结果是可以实现的。当玩家只观察他们的直接前辈群体的贡献时,这一点特别有趣,我们观察到玩家在激励其他人做出贡献方面发挥着重要作用。

英文摘要:

We model a dynamic public good contribution game, where players are (naturally) formed into groups. The groups are exogenously placed in a sequence, with limited information available to players about their groups' position in the sequence. Contribution decisions are made by players simultaneously and independently, and the groups' total contribution is made sequentially. We try to capture both inter and intra-group behaviors and analyze different situations where players observe partial history about total contributions of their predecessor groups. Given this framework, we show that even when players observe a history of defection (no contribution), a cooperative outcome is achievable. This is particularly interesting in the situation when players observe only their immediate predecessor groups' contribution, where we observe that players play an important role in motivating others to contribute.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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