具有不确定性的非合作博弈
Non-Cooperative Games with Uncertainty
AI总结:
本文提出了一个有限非合作博弈框架,其中参与者通过选择混合策略并投射主观先验来应对无共同先验的全局不确定参数,定义了“扩展均衡”并证明了其存在性,同时统一了基于后悔的统计决策理论与博弈论。
摘要:
本文提出了一个有限非合作博弈的框架,其中每个参与者面临一个全局不确定的参数且没有共同先验。每个参与者同时选择混合策略,并对不确定参数投射一个涌现的主观先验。我们通过要求没有任何参与者能通过单方面改变策略来提高其期望效用,且涌现的主观先验能最大化参与者的期望后悔值,从而定义了“扩展均衡”。基于 Brouwer 不动点定理并模仿 Nash 构造的不动点论证确保了其存在性。此外,“No Fictional Faith”定理表明,如果参数确实对某参与者有重要影响,则任何主观均衡先验都必须保持非集中状态。该方法提供了一个统一基于后悔的统计决策理论与博弈论的框架,为处理具有深度不确定参数的策略决策提供了工具。
英文摘要:
This paper introduces a framework for finite non-cooperative games where each player faces a globally uncertain parameter with no common prior. Every player chooses both a mixed strategy and projects an emergent subjective prior to the uncertain parameters. We define an "Extended Equilibrium" by requiring that no player can improve her expected utility via a unilateral change of strategy, and the emergent subjective priors are such that they maximize the expected regret of the players. A fixed-point argument -- based on Brouwer's fixed point theorem and mimicking the construction of Nash -- ensures existence. Additionally, the "No Fictional Faith" theorem shows that any subjective equilibrium prior must stay non-concentrated if the parameter truly matters to a player. This approach provides a framework that unifies regret-based statistical decision theory and game theory, yielding a tool for handling strategic decision-making in the presence of deeply uncertain parameters.
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