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arXiv 2402.14952econ.TH
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非合作解概念下合作博弈的实现

Implementations of Cooperative Games Under Non-Cooperative Solution Concepts

Justin Chan

AI总结:

该研究将合作博弈视为可签约束协议的非合作博弈,证明了不同超加性类型的合作博弈在纳什均衡、可理性化、颤抖手完美均衡等非合作解概念下的可实现性,并探讨了解概念的选择问题。

摘要:

合作博弈可被视为一类特殊的非合作博弈:其中参与者可自由签署有约束力的协议以形成联盟。这些联盟拥有联合策略集,并追求最大化集体收益。当在某种非合作解概念下,每个联盟的收益与其在合作博弈中的价值一致时,称该合作博弈是可实现的,对应的非合作博弈则为其实现形式。本文证明:所有严格超加性的划分函数形式博弈在纳什均衡与可理性化解概念下均可实现;所有弱超加性的特征函数形式博弈在纳什均衡下均可实现;所有弱超加性的划分函数形式博弈在颤抖手完美均衡下均可实现。随后本文讨论了实现合作博弈时非合作解概念的恰当选择问题。

英文摘要:

Cooperative games can be distinguished as non-cooperative games in which players can freely sign binding agreements to form coalitions. These coalitions inherit a joint strategy set and seek to maximize collective payoffs. When the payoffs to each coalition under some non-cooperative solution concept coincide with their value in the cooperative game, the cooperative game is said to be implementable and the non-cooperative game its implementation. This paper proves that all strictly superadditive partition function form games are implementable under Nash equilibrium and rationalizability; that all weakly superadditive characteristic function form games are implementable under Nash equilibrium; and that all weakly superadditive partition function form games are implementable under trembling hand perfect equilibrium. Discussion then proceeds on the appropriate choice of non-cooperative solution concept for the implementation.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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