天然气管网合作博弈模型中转移利润的外部性分析
Modelling transfer profits as externalities in a cooperative game-theoretic model of natural gas networks
摘要:
现有的合作博弈理论研究天然气管道系统中的讨价还价能力是基于所谓的特征函数形式(CFF)。如果某些管道属于受监管的第三方接入(TPA),这种方法可能会产生误导。TPA现在已经成为欧盟的规范,它要求管道所有者为其他人运输天然气,前提是他们支付规定的运输费。从博弈论的角度来看,这种制度设置产生了所谓的“外部性”,其描述需要配分函数形式(PFF)博弈。在本文中,我们提出了一种方法来计算支付,反映的权力结构,与调节TPA的管道系统。该方法是基于一个迭代的流量机制,以确定气体流量和运输费用的个人球员,并使用递归的核心和最小索赔函数转换PPF游戏回到CFF游戏,这可以通过标准的方法来解决。我们说明了一个简单的程式化的数值例子,在中东欧的天然气网络的方法,重点是乌克兰的电力指数作为一个主要的过境国。
英文摘要:
Existing cooperative game theoretic studies of bargaining power in gas pipeline systems are based on the so called characteristic function form (CFF). This approach is potentially misleading if some pipelines fall under regulated third party access (TPA). TPA, which is by now the norm in the EU, obliges the owner of a pipeline to transport gas for others, provided they pay a regulated transport fee. From a game theoretic perspective, this institutional setting creates so called "externalities," the description of which requires partition function form (PFF) games. In this paper we propose a method to compute payoffs, reflecting the power structure, for a pipeline system with regulated TPA. The method is based on an iterative flow mechanism to determine gas flows and transport fees for individual players and uses the recursive core and the minimal claim function to convert the PPF game back into a CFF game, which can be solved by standard methods. We illustrate the approach with a simple stylized numerical example of the gas network in Central Eastern Europe with a focus on Ukraine's power index as a major transit country.
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