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arXiv 2302.00608econ.THcs.DScs.GT
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投资管理博弈:扩展核概念的范围

The Investment Management Game: Extending the Scope of the Notion of Core

Vijay V. Vazirani

AI总结:

本文提出投资管理博弈,将核概念从合作博弈扩展到对抗自然的单智能体场景,并在完美图上完整刻画其核,利用全对偶整性而非全幺模性,展示了核的广泛适用性。

摘要:

核是经济学和合作博弈论中的一个主导解概念;它主要用于利润(等价地,成本或效用)的分配。本文通过提出一种完全不同的用途来展示这一概念的多样性:在所谓的投资管理博弈中,这是一种对抗自然的博弈,而非合作博弈。该博弈只有一个智能体,其策略集是将她的资金分配给投资公司的所有可能方式。智能体希望选择一个策略,使得在指数级多的未来情景中的每一种情景下,在正确的公司中有足够的资金可用,以便她能为该情景购买最优投资。在核的传统形式框架下,这种策略构成了一种广义解释下的核配置。我们的博弈定义在完美图上,因为对于这类图,最大稳定集问题可以在多项式时间内求解。我们完全刻画了该博弈的核,类似于Shapley和Shubik对指派博弈核的刻画。一个关键区别是以下技术新颖性:他们的刻画源于全幺模性,而我们的刻画源于全对偶整性。

英文摘要:

The core is a dominant solution concept in economics and cooperative game theory; it is predominantly used for profit, equivalently cost or utility, sharing. This paper demonstrates the versatility of this notion by proposing a completely different use: in a so-called investment management game, which is a game against nature rather than a cooperative game. This game has only one agent whose strategy set is all possible ways of distributing her money among investment firms. The agent wants to pick a strategy such that in each of exponentially many future scenarios, sufficient money is available in the right firms so she can buy an optimal investment for that scenario. Such a strategy constitutes a core imputation under a broad interpretation, though traditional formal framework, of the core. Our game is defined on perfect graphs, since the maximum stable set problem can be solved in polynomial time for such graphs. We completely characterize the core of this game, analogous to Shapley and Shubik characterization of the core of the assignment game. A key difference is the following technical novelty: whereas their characterization follows from total unimodularity, ours follows from total dual integrality

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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