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arXiv 2408.17335econ.TH
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精英为何扩展产权:解锁投资与向公共品的转变

Why do elites extend property rights: unlocking investment and the switch to public goods

Alastair Langtry

AI总结:

本文提出精英自愿扩展产权的新机制:通过改变精英激励使其转向公共品供给,从而解决征用承诺问题并解锁投资,同时发现精英属少数身份群体时产权扩展更难实现。

摘要:

本文为自利的经济精英自愿扩展产权提供了一种新的解释。当行为主体做出内生投资决策时,存在承诺问题。事后,精英面临强烈的激励去征用非精英(没有产权的人)的投资,这会抑制投资。将产权扩展到新群体可以解决这一问题,即使对那些未被赋予产权的人也是如此,因为它使公共品供给对精英更具吸引力。与其他关于选举权扩展的模型不同,本文中的产权扩展并不涉及精英将控制权让渡给他人。相反,它改变了精英所面临的激励。此外,在模型中加入身份群体表明,当精英属于少数身份群体时,其解决承诺问题的激励较弱——身份碎片化使一个社会更难扩展产权。

英文摘要:

This paper presents a new rationale for a self-interested economic elite voluntarily extending property rights. When agents make endogenous investment decisions, there is a commitment problem. Ex-post, the elite face strong incentives to expropriate investments from the non-elite (who don't have property rights), which dissuades investment. Extending property rights to new groups can resolve this problem, even for those not given property rights, by making public good provision more attractive to the elite. Unlike other models of franchise extensions, extending property rights in this paper does not involve the elite ceding control to others. Rather, it changes the incentives they face. Additionally, adding identity groups to the model shows that an elite faces weaker incentives to resolve the commitment problem when it is part of a minority identity -- identity fragmentation makes it harder for a society to extend property rights.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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