合作对策Gately点唯一的条件
Conditions for the uniqueness of the Gately point for cooperative games
摘要:
我们正在研究盖特利点,合作博弈的一个既定的解决方案的概念。我们指出,有超加法游戏的盖特利点是不唯一的,即在一般情况下的概念,而不是一个实际的点集值。我们得出的条件下,盖特利点保证是一个独特的插补,并提供了一个几何解释。盖特利点可以理解为由两个点定义的直线与插补集的交点。我们的唯一性条件保证这两点不重合。我们提供了负面倾向破坏的示范性解释。我们简要地表明,我们的唯一性条件的盖特利点包括拟平衡的游戏,并讨论了盖特利点的关系,在这种情况下的$τ$ -值。最后,我们指出了成本游戏和ACA方法的关系,并结束后的几个意见的实现盖特利点和即将推出的软件包合作博弈论。
英文摘要:
We are studying the Gately point, an established solution concept for cooperative games. We point out that there are superadditive games for which the Gately point is not unique, i.e. in general the concept is rather set-valued than an actual point. We derive conditions under which the Gately point is guaranteed to be a unique imputation and provide a geometric interpretation. The Gately point can be understood as the intersection of a line defined by two points with the set of imputations. Our uniqueness conditions guarantee that these two points do not coincide. We provide demonstrative interpretations for negative propensities to disrupt. We briefly show that our uniqueness conditions for the Gately point include quasibalanced games and discuss the relation of the Gately point to the $τ$-value in this context. Finally, we point out relations to cost games and the ACA method and end upon a few remarks on the implementation of the Gately point and an upcoming software package for cooperative game theory.
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