一种高效且抗女巫攻击的投票机制
An Efficient and Sybil Attack Resistant Voting Mechanism
AI总结:
本文针对去中心化决策中的女巫攻击问题,基于贝叶斯机制设计提出一种通过财富存款和结果相关转移支付实现的投票机制,并证明其在参与者风险中性且拥有私人信息时同时满足抗女巫攻击性与高效性。
摘要:
投票机制是去中心化决策中被广泛接受和使用的方法。确保投票机制结果的可接受性是稳健投票系统的一项关键特征。考虑如下场景:一组个体希望从一组备选方案中选择一个选项,而无需身份识别或人格证明系统。此外,他们希望以功利主义作为选择标准。在这种情况下,参与者可能使用虚假账户多次提交投票,即通常所说的女巫攻击(Sybil attack, SA),这对去中心化组织构成了挑战。是否存在一种投票机制,既能始终防止参与者通过多次投票获益(抗女巫攻击,SA-proof),又能选出使所有参与者附加估值总和最大化的方案(高效)?一人一票既非抗女巫攻击也非高效。代币投票是抗女巫攻击的,但不高效。二次方投票是高效的,但不抗女巫攻击。本研究使用贝叶斯机制设计提出一种解决方案。该机制的结构如下:参与者存入财富以表明其对每个备选方案的偏好强度。然后,每个参与者根据其存款和投票结果获得一定金额。所提出的机制依赖于两个核心概念:1)转移支付受结果影响的方式使得每个参与者的最优行动仅取决于个人偏好和备选方案数量;2)通过多个账户投票的参与者对所有参与者期望效用的轻微降低大于其获得的个人收益。本研究证明,如果参与者是风险中性的,且每个参与者对其偏好和信念拥有私人信息,那么该机制是抗女巫攻击且高效的。这项研究为设计更稳健的去中心化决策机制提供了新的见解。
英文摘要:
Voting mechanisms are widely accepted and used methods for decentralized decision-making. Ensuring the acceptance of the voting mechanism's outcome is a crucial characteristic of robust voting systems. Consider this scenario: A group of individuals wants to choose an option from a set of alternatives without requiring an identification or proof-of-personhood system. Moreover, they want to implement utilitarianism as their selection criteria. In such a case, players could submit votes multiple times using dummy accounts, commonly known as a Sybil attack (SA), which presents a challenge for decentralized organizations. Is there a voting mechanism that always prevents players from benefiting by casting votes multiple times (SA-proof) while also selecting the alternative that maximizes the added valuations of all players (efficient)? One-person-one-vote is neither SA-proof nor efficient. Coin voting is SA-proof but not efficient. Quadratic voting is efficient but not SA-proof. This study uses Bayesian mechanism design to propose a solution. The mechanism's structure is as follows: Players make wealth deposits to indicate the strength of their preference for each alternative. Each player then receives an amount based on their deposit and the voting outcome. The proposed mechanism relies on two main concepts: 1) Transfers are influenced by the outcome in a way that each player's optimal action depends only on individual preferences and the number of alternatives; 2) A player who votes through multiple accounts slightly reduces the expected utility of all players more than the individual benefit gained. This study demonstrates that if players are risk-neutral and each player has private information about their preferences and beliefs, then the mechanism is SA-proof and efficient. This research provides new insights into the design of more robust decentralized decision-making mechanisms.
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