arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv周末暂无论文更新,休息一下吧,周末愉快~~
arXiv 2006.15306econ.TH
收藏

有偏信念均衡

Biased-Belief Equilibrium

Yuval Heller, Eyal Winter

摘要:

我们调查如何扭曲,但结构化,信念可以坚持在战略形势。具体来说,我们研究两个玩家的游戏中,每个玩家都被赋予了一个偏置的信念函数,表示一个球员的信念之间的差异,对手的战略和实际的战略。我们的均衡条件要求:(i)每个参与人都选择一个最佳对策来应对他对对手策略的扭曲信念,(ii)扭曲函数形成彼此的最优反应。我们获得了尖锐的预测和新的见解的一组稳定的结果和他们的支持稳定的偏见,在各类游戏。

英文摘要:

We investigate how distorted, yet structured, beliefs can persist in strategic situations. Specifically, we study two-player games in which each player is endowed with a biased-belief function that represents the discrepancy between a player's beliefs about the opponent's strategy and the actual strategy. Our equilibrium condition requires that (i) each player choose a best-response strategy to his distorted belief about the opponent's strategy, and (ii) the distortion functions form best responses to one another. We obtain sharp predictions and novel insights into the set of stable outcomes and their supporting stable biases in various classes of games.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

↑