不可知序贯理性
Agnostic Sequential Rationality
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中文总结 AI 辅助
该研究提出不可知序贯均衡（ASE），它是序贯均衡的精炼，适用于含连续行动的动态博弈，还被不可知序贯多均衡推广，明确了其与序贯均衡、完美贝叶斯均衡的关系。
中文摘要 AI 辅助
不可知序贯均衡（Agnostic Sequential Equilibrium，简称ASE）是序贯均衡的一种精炼，它不强制要求参与者采用单一、任意的信念系统。此外，序贯均衡假设参与者的信念完全一致（该概念基于策略的扰动），而ASE采用了一种新颖、更简单且局部的策略组合与非均衡路径信念之间的强一致性概念，适用于一大类动态博弈，包括具有连续行动的博弈。在这方面，该新解概念与完美贝叶斯均衡类似。研究表明，在具有完美回忆的不完美信息扩展式博弈中，一个策略组合是ASE当且仅当它是具有每个完全一致信念系统的序贯均衡。ASE被集值解概念不可知序贯多均衡（agnostic sequential polyequilibrium）所推广，该概念允许在某些信息集中将参与者的行动部分或完全不指定。
英文摘要
Agnostic sequential equilibrium (ASE) is a refinement of sequential equilibrium that does not force on the players a single, arbitrary belief system. In addition, whereas sequential equilibrium assumes the players' beliefs to be fully consistent (a notion that is based on perturbations of strategies), ASE employs a novel, simpler and local concept of strong consistency between strategy profiles and off-equilibrium beliefs, which is applicable to a large class of dynamic games, including games with a continuum of actions. In the last respect, the new solution concept is similar to perfect Bayesian equilibrium. It is shown that a strategy profile in an imperfect-information extensive-form game with perfect recall is an ASE precisely when it is a sequential equilibrium with every fully consistent belief system. ASE is generalized by the set-valued solution concept of agnostic sequential polyequilibrium, which allows leaving the players' actions in some information sets partially or completely unspecified.
