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arXiv 2307.06309econ.TH
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S均衡:(行为)博弈论的综合

S Equilibrium: A Synthesis of (Behavioral) Game Theory

Jacob K Goeree, Bernardo Garcia-Pola

AI总结:

本文提出集合值的$S$均衡,以统一经典与行为博弈论模型,并通过多类实验博弈证明其样本内外预测优于level-$k$和QRE。

摘要:

$S$均衡综合了一个世纪以来的博弈论建模。$S$-信念决定选择,如同在精炼文献和level-$k$中一样,但不锚定于Nash均衡,也不施加特设的信念形成方式。$S$-选择允许错误,如同在QRE中一样,但不施加理性预期。$S$均衡被明确设定为集合值,以避免常见做法:从一个隐式定义、规模未知且未被说明的集合中选择最佳预测。$S$-均衡集合随复杂性参数而变化,从而在准确性与精确性之间提供权衡,这不同于$M$均衡。简单的“区域度量”确定模型参数,并表明相对规模为5%的选择集合捕获了58%的数据。应用于一系列广泛实验博弈数据的拟合优度检验,证实了$S$均衡在样本内和样本外预测行为的能力。相比之下,level-$k$和QRE的选择(信念)预测在大多数(所有)博弈中被拒绝。

英文摘要:

$S$ equilibrium synthesizes a century of game-theoretic modeling. $S$-beliefs determine choices as in the refinement literature and level-$k$, without anchoring on Nash equilibrium or imposing ad hoc belief formation. $S$-choices allow for mistakes as in QRE, without imposing rational expectations. $S$ equilibrium is explicitly set-valued to avoid the common practice of selecting the best prediction from an implicitly defined set of unknown, and unaccounted for, size. $S$-equilibrium sets vary with a complexity parameter, offering a trade-off between accuracy and precision unlike in $M$ equilibrium. Simple "areametrics" determine the model's parameter and show that choice sets with a relative size of 5 percent capture 58 percent percent of the data. Goodness-of-fit tests applied to data from a broad array of experimental games confirm $S$ equilibrium's ability to predict behavior in and out of sample. In contrast, choice (belief) predictions of level-$k$ and QRE are rejected in most (all) games.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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