情境错位下的战略行为
Strategic Behavior under Context Misalignment
摘要：
我们研究了理性和理性中的共同强烈信念（RCSBR）的行为含义，其中上下文假设允许玩家接受错位的信念，即，在没有对手持有这些信念的情况下，玩家可以持有关于其对手信念的信念。从分析师的角度来看，我们通过引入分离类型结构的概念，将参与者实际持有的无限信念层次（“真实类型”）与参与者层次结构的副产品（“想象类型”）区分开来。我们通过Battigalli & Friedenberg（2012）的Full Strong Best-Reply Sets的一系列子集来描述RCSBR对所有分离类型结构的真实类型的行为影响。通过允许不对齐，在动态游戏中，我们可以获得与RCSBR（在标准框架中）不一致的行为预测，与静态游戏基于信念的分析相反-由于二分法“非单调与单调”推理的差异。
英文摘要：
We study the behavioral implications of Rationality and Common Strong Belief in Rationality (RCSBR) with contextual assumptions allowing players to entertain misaligned beliefs, i.e., players can hold beliefs concerning their opponents' beliefs where there is no opponent holding those very beliefs. Taking the analysts' perspective, we distinguish the infinite hierarchies of beliefs actually held by players ("real types") from those that are a byproduct of players' hierarchies ("imaginary types") by introducing the notion of separating type structure. We characterize the behavioral implications of RCSBR for the real types across all separating type structures via a family of subsets of Full Strong Best-Reply Sets of Battigalli & Friedenberg (2012). By allowing misalignment, in dynamic games we can obtain behavioral predictions inconsistent with RCSBR (in the standard framework), contrary to the case of belief-based analyses for static games--a difference due to the dichotomy "non-monotonic vs. monotonic" reasoning.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
