发表机构
University of Bonn; Technical University of Munich（波恩大学; 慕尼黑工业大学）
机构由 AI 辅助整理，请以论文原文为准。AI 中文总结
研究两人零和博弈中无需理性共同知识等假设的均衡博弈证明方法，通过考虑为子博弈分配合理行动的解概念并施加理性和继承性条件，刻画了一致选择纳什均衡支撑集的解概念，确保均衡通常唯一。
AI 中文摘要
两人零和博弈中的均衡博弈通常通过认知假设来证明其合理性，比如理性和信念的共同知识，这些假设远远超出了参与者的理性。我们提出了一种无需这些假设的证明方法。为此，我们考虑了一些解概念，这些概念为给定博弈的每个子博弈为每个参与者分配一组合理行动，并施加两个条件。理性要求合理集是未被占优策略的支撑集，或者等价地，所有合理行动都是对对手共同信念的最佳回应。继承性要求当不合理行动被摒弃时，合理行动仍然合理。在两人博弈中，这两个条件刻画了一致选择纳什均衡支撑集的解概念。零和收益确保纳什均衡——以及因此的选择——通常是唯一的。因此，均衡博弈源于个体理性以及当不合理行动被摒弃时合理性判断持续存在的相互理解。
英文摘要
Equilibrium play in two-player zero-sum games is usually justified via epistemic assumptions, such as mutual knowledge of rationality and beliefs, that go far beyond the rationality of the players. We propose a justification that dispenses with these assumptions. To this end, we consider solution concepts that assign to every subgame of a given game a set of plausible actions for each player, and we impose two conditions. Rationality requires that the plausible sets are supports of undominated strategies or, equivalently, that all plausible actions are best responses to a common belief about the opponent. Inheritance requires that plausible actions remain plausible when implausible actions are discarded. In two-player games, the two conditions generically characterize the solution concepts that consistently select supports of Nash equilibria. Zero-sum payoffs ensure that Nash equilibria are generically unique, so that such a selection exists and is unique. Equilibrium play thus emerges from individual rationality and the mutual understanding that plausibility judgments persist when implausible actions are discarded.
