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arXiv 2202.07517econ.THecon.EM
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策略不确定性下一级价格拍卖的均衡模型:理论与实证

An Equilibrium Model of the First-Price Auction with Strategic Uncertainty: Theory and Empirics

Bernhard Kasberger

摘要:

在许多第一价格拍卖中,投标人面临着相当大的战略不确定性:他们不能完全预测其他投标人的投标行为。我们提出了一个模型,在该模型中,投标人不知道对手出价的整个分布,但只有预期(获胜)的出价和上下限的对手出价。我们刻画了最优投标策略,并证明了均衡信念的存在性。最后,我们应用该模型来估计公路采购拍卖的成本分布,并发现良好的性能外的样本。

英文摘要:

In many first-price auctions, bidders face considerable strategic uncertainty: They cannot perfectly anticipate the other bidders' bidding behavior. We propose a model in which bidders do not know the entire distribution of opponent bids but only the expected (winning) bid and lower and upper bounds on the opponent bids. We characterize the optimal bidding strategies and prove the existence of equilibrium beliefs. Finally, we apply the model to estimate the cost distribution in highway procurement auctions and find good performance out-of-sample.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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