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arXiv 2603.17733econ.TH
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拍卖前策略沟通

Pre-auction strategic communication

Massachusetts Institute of Technology(麻省理工学院)

Eric Yan

AI总结:

研究竞拍者与卖家在拍卖前进行非约束性沟通的博弈模型,发现均衡中卖家最多运行一个统一保留价的第二价格拍卖,歧视性拍卖不会出现。

摘要:

高风险的拍卖通常伴随着竞拍者与卖家之间的非约束性沟通。我研究了一个两期模型,其中竞拍者在卖家决定是否运行一个机制或采取一个可放弃的外部选择之前,私下向卖家发送关于其估值的廉价谈话信息。卖家在第二期机制内具有承诺能力,但在如何使用第一期沟通方面没有承诺。在单调的竞拍者对称均衡中,不受限制的卖家在均衡路径上最多运行一个机制:一个具有共同保留价的第二价格拍卖,并且只有当所有竞拍者报告的价值高于一个共同阈值时。因此,尽管存在非对称的路径后验,歧视性拍卖在均衡中不会出现。对于两个竞拍者,如果卖家能够事前承诺采用共同保留价的第二价格拍卖,她会变得更好,有时甚至能达到完全承诺的收益。

英文摘要:

High-stakes auctions are often preceded by nonbinding communication between bidders and the seller. I study a two-period model in which bidders privately send cheap-talk messages to the seller about their valuations before the seller decides whether to run a mechanism or take a forfeitable outside option. The seller has commitment within the second-period mechanism but not over how she uses first-period communication. In monotone bidder-symmetric equilibria, an unrestricted seller runs at most one mechanism on the equilibrium path: a second-price auction with a common reserve, and only when all bidders report values above a common threshold. Thus discriminatory auctions cannot arise in equilibrium, despite asymmetric on-path posteriors. With two bidders, the seller is better off, and can sometimes attain her full-commitment payoff, if she can commit ex-ante to second-price auctions with a common reserve.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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