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arXiv 2409.11048econ.TH
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存在强竞拍者的近似最优拍卖

Approximately Optimal Auctions With a Strong Bidder

Luca Anderlini, GaOn Kim

AI总结:

针对含一个强竞拍者的拍卖场景,提出锦标赛式拍卖机制,在特定分布条件下其收益可任意接近Myerson最优拍卖,且该机制无需分布细节信息,为卖家配置拍卖竞拍者提供策略参考。

摘要:

我们研究有N+1个竞拍者的拍卖场景。其中,N个竞拍者是对称的,第N+1个竞拍者相对于其余竞拍者“足够强”。该拍卖是一种“锦标赛”形式:前N个竞拍者通过竞价赢得与第N+1个竞拍者竞争的资格。前N个竞拍者的出价具有约束力,出价最高者将进入与第N+1个竞拍者的二价竞争环节。\n当第N+1个竞拍者的估值在分布上收敛于一个位于N个竞拍者分布上端之上的原子(atom),且分布的其余部分从低值区流失的速度足够慢时,该拍卖的期望收益可任意接近Myerson(1981)最优拍卖的收益。\n这种锦标赛设计是“无细节(detail free)”的,即除了满足第N+1个竞拍者强于其他竞拍者这一要求外,无需知晓分布的具体信息。尤其无需掌握该原子估值的额外信息。这一点十分重要,因为在尝试实施最优拍卖时,哪怕出现极少量的校准偏差,都可能导致收益的大幅损失。\n我们对这些结果给出了一种解读:它们或许能为卖家提供策略指导,即便只有较弱的竞拍者可用,也能策略性地为拍卖“配置”单个强竞拍者。

英文摘要:

We consider auctions with N+1 bidders. Of these, N are symmetric and N+1 is "sufficiently strong" relative to the others. The auction is a "tournament" in which the first N players bid to win the right to compete with N+1. The bids of the first N players are binding and the highest bidder proceeds to a second-price competition with N+1. When N+1's values converge in distribution to an atom above the upper end of the distribution of the N bidders and the rest of the distribution is drained away from low values sufficiently slowly, the auction's expected revenue is arbitrarily close to the one obtained in a Myerson (1981) optimal auction. The tournament design is "detail free" in the sense that no specific knowledge of the distributions is needed in addition to the fact that bidder N+1 is stronger than the others as required. In particular, no additional information about the value of the atom is needed. This is important since mis-calibrating by a small amount an attempt to implement the optimal auction can lead to large losses in revenue. We provide an interpretation of these results as possibly providing guidelines to a seller on how to strategically "populate" auctions with a single bidder even when only weaker bidders are available.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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