We consider auctions with N+1 bidders. Of these, N are symmetric and N+1 is "sufficiently strong" relative to the others. The auction is a "tournament" in which the first N players bid to win the right to compete with N+1. The bids of the first N players are binding and the highest bidder proceeds to a second-price competition with N+1.
When N+1's values converge in distribution to an atom above the upper end of the distribution of the N bidders and the rest of the distribution is drained away from low values sufficiently slowly, the auction's expected revenue is arbitrarily close to the one obtained in a Myerson (1981) optimal auction.
The tournament design is "detail free" in the sense that no specific knowledge of the distributions is needed in addition to the fact that bidder N+1 is stronger than the others as required. In particular, no additional information about the value of the atom is needed. This is important since mis-calibrating by a small amount an attempt to implement the optimal auction can lead to large losses in revenue.
We provide an interpretation of these results as possibly providing guidelines to a seller on how to strategically "populate" auctions with a single bidder even when only weaker bidders are available.
Learning to Coordinate Bidders in Non-Truthful Auctions
Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, School of Computing and Artificial Intelligence, Key Laboratory of Interdisciplinary Research of Computation and Economics(上海财经大学,计算机与人工智能学院,计算与经济学交叉研究重点实验室);Microsoft Research & The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen(微软研究院及香港中文大学(深圳))
Market Design Center, Graduate School of Economics, The University of Tokyo(东京大学经济学研究市场设计中心);Graduate School of Informatics and Engineering, The University of Electro-Communications(电波大学信息工程研究生院)
Raising Bidders' Awareness in Second-Price Auctions
Jinhe Center for Economic Research, Xi’an Jiaotong University(西安交通大学金台经济研究中心);School of Economics and Management, Xinjiang University(新疆大学经济与管理学院);Department of Economics, University of California, Davis(加州大学戴维斯分校经济学系)
Università Bocconi(博科尼大学);Google Research(谷歌研究);Stanford University, Graduate School of Business(斯坦福大学商学院);Department of Economics, Harvard University(哈佛大学经济学系)
Johannes Kepler University Linz(林茨约翰·开普勒大学);Austrian Institute of Economic Research(奥地利经济研究所);Inria/FairPlay(法国国家信息与自动化研究所/公平游戏实验室);Tel Aviv University(特拉维夫大学);Maison Française d’Oxford, CNRS and Department of Economics, University of Oxford(牛津法国之家、法国国家科学研究中心及牛津大学经济学系)
Stanford University(斯坦福大学);Weizmann Institute of Science(魏茨曼科学研究所);The University of Chicago Booth School of Business(芝加哥大学布斯商学院);Ben-Gurion University of the Negev(内盖夫本-古里安大学)