有 contingent 支付和 costly 验证的最优拍卖设计
Optimal Auction Design with Contingent Payments and Costly Verification
AI总结:
本文研究了设计一个生成收入的资产(如知识产权许可)的拍卖,考虑投标人对未来收入的信号以及审计成本,通过线性 royalties 和 cap 优化收益。
摘要:
我们研究了设计一个生成收入的资产(如知识产权许可)的拍卖。每个投标人对获得资产后的未来收入有信号。资产分配后,赢家的收入私有实现。主方可以以成本审计赢家,并根据赢家的实现收入收取支付。我们解决了一个拍卖,以最大化主方的收益,净审计成本。赢家被收取线性版税,直到上限,超过后不再审计。更高的投标人支付更多现金预付,并面临较低的版税上限。
英文摘要:
We study the design of an auction for an income-generating asset such as an intellectual property license. Each bidder has a signal about his future income from acquiring the asset. After the asset is allocated, the winner's income from the asset is realized privately. The principal can audit the winner, at a cost, and then charge a payment contingent on the winner's realized income. We solve for an auction that maximizes the principal's revenue, net of auditing costs. The winning bidder is charged linear royalties up to a cap, beyond which there is no auditing. A higher bidder pays more in cash upfront and faces a lower royalty cap.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。