代币拍卖:作为机制设计选择的货币政策
Auctions with Tokens: Monetary Policy as a Mechanism Design Choice
AI总结:
该研究对比代币拍卖与传统美元拍卖,发现二者预期收益现值相当,代币拍卖收益到账更早且波动更低,最优政策为销毁支付代币,且二者的等价性会随缔约摩擦程度变化而打破。
摘要:
本文研究了一种重复拍卖机制,其中支付通过由拍卖设计者创建并最初持有的区块链代币完成。与机制设计领域此前研究的“虚拟货币”不同,这类代币可在机制之外被储蓄和交易。研究表明,该拍卖的预期收益现值与传统美元拍卖的预期收益现值相等,但前者的收益到账更早且波动性更低。最优货币政策会销毁用于支付的代币,这一做法在基于区块链的协议中十分常见。研究还发现,若拍卖方发行合适的美元计价证券,美元拍卖也能实现相同结果。这种等价性在存在道德风险和缔约摩擦时会被打破:当缔约摩擦严重时,代币拍卖更具优势;而当缔约摩擦较小时,搭配美元计价金融工具的美元拍卖更优。
英文摘要:
I study a repeated auction in which payments are made with a blockchain token created and initially owned by the auction designer. Unlike the ``virtual money'' previously examined in mechanism design, such tokens can be saved and traded outside the mechanism. I show that the present-discounted value of expected revenues equals that of a conventional dollar auction, but revenues accrue earlier and are less volatile. The optimal monetary policy burns the tokens used for payment, a practice common in blockchain-based protocols. I also show that the same outcome can be reproduced in a dollar auction if the auctioneer issues a suitable dollar-denominated security. This equivalence breaks down with moral hazard and contracting frictions: with severe contracting frictions the token auction dominates, whereas with mild contracting frictions the dollar auction combined with a dollar-denominated financial instrument is preferred.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。