发表机构
HKUST Business School, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology（香港科技大学商学院）
机构由 AI 辅助整理，请以论文原文为准。AI 中文总结
本文研究信念分歧下拍卖的支付设计，通过线性规划刻画租金配置，并基于eBay数据校准发现拍卖格式优势依赖于出价带划分，强调界面分辨率与支付规则需联合设计。
AI 中文摘要
当拍卖竞买者误判其对手时，卖家不仅可以改变信息租金的数额，还可以改变信息租金交付的状态。我们探究这种支付设计机会在有限出价界面、非负支付限制以及与相同信念下传统拍卖的比较中何时能够存续。我们将支付设计表述为一个关于非负竞买者租金的线性规划。当某个状态对于其目标类型而言成本最低且对潜在模仿者最不具有吸引力时，该状态可以安全地承载一份报告的租金。我们刻画了这种对齐关系，在对齐不完美时界定了受限支付架构的成本，并在排序冲突时使用影子价格。自身类型投影为固定分配产生了唯一的最优期望支付规则。连续出价带在每个价值处实现诚实报告，但会产生合并损失和带内剩余。在独立的平滑信念模型下，可行的诚实规则和收入上界支持与相同信念下的一价均衡进行比较。使用1,000条eBay证明集拍卖记录进行的校准说明了依赖于分区的反转：在一种情景下，一价拍卖在十个等概率出价带上支配所有完全诚实、无补贴的规则，而在十个等美元出价带上，一种更丰富的或有规则则优于一价拍卖。运营者应联合选择界面分辨率、支付依赖性和完整性容忍度。验证支持激励的概率，在相同信念下比较拍卖格式，并区分重新设计与部署。任何收款优势必须覆盖实施成本才能意味着利润优势。
英文摘要
When auction bidders misperceive their rivals, a seller can change not only the amount of information rent but also the states in which it is delivered. We ask when this payment-design opportunity survives a finite bidding interface, nonnegative-payment restrictions, and comparison with conventional auctions under the same beliefs. We formulate payment design as a linear program in nonnegative bidder rents. A single state can safely carry a report's rent when it is both cheapest for its intended type and least attractive to potential mimics. We characterize this alignment, bound the cost of a restricted payment architecture when alignment is imperfect, and use shadow prices when the rankings conflict. Own-type projection yields a unique optimal expected-payment rule for a fixed allocation. Contiguous bid bands implement truthful reporting at every value, but create pooling losses and within-band surplus. Under a separate smooth-belief model, feasible truthful rules and revenue upper bounds support comparisons with a first-price equilibrium under the same beliefs. A calibration using 1,000 eBay proof-set auction records illustrates a partition-dependent reversal: first price dominates all exactly truthful, no-subsidy rules on ten equal-probability bands in one scenario, while a richer contingent rule on ten equal-dollar bands outperforms it. An operator should choose interface resolution, payment dependence, and integrity tolerances jointly. Validate the probabilities that support incentives, compare formats under the same beliefs, and distinguish redesign from deployment. Any receipt advantage must cover implementation costs before it can imply a profit advantage.
