拍卖设计中的公平性:单位需求代理与非准线性偏好
Equity in auction design with unit-demand agents and non-quasilinear preferences
AI总结:
本文提出了一种基于公平性的拍卖机制,该机制在单位需求代理和非准线性偏好下实现策略可行、个体理性、同等对待、无浪费和无补贴。
摘要:
我们研究了一个拍卖设计模型,其中卖家将一组物品分配给一组代理,每个代理最多获得一个物品。每个代理对(物品,支付)对的偏好不必是准线性的。如果域包含所有经典偏好,我们证明存在一个唯一的机制,即最小瓦尔拉斯均衡价格(MWEP)机制,该机制是策略可行的、个体理性的,并满足同等对待、无浪费(每个物品都被分配给某个代理)和无补贴(没有代理被补贴)。这为MWEP机制提供了基于公平性的特征描述,并补充了文献中已知的基于效率的MWEP机制特征描述。
英文摘要:
We study a model of auction design where a seller is selling a set of objects to a set of agents who can be assigned no more than one object. Each agent's preference over (object, payment) pair need not be quasilinear. If the domain contains all classical preferences, we show that there is a unique mechanism, the minimum Walrasian equilibrium price (MWEP) mechanism, which is strategy-proof, individually rational, and satisfies equal treatment of equals, no-wastage (every object is allocated to some agent), and no-subsidy (no agent is subsidized). This provides an equity-based characterization of the MEWP mechanism, and complements the efficiency-based characterization of the MWEP mechanism known in the literature.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。