不透明合同
Opaque Contracts
摘要：
公司可以获得有关市场参与者的大量数据。他们使用这些数据将合同锁定给具有特定特征的代理人，并以不透明的术语描述这些合同。针对这些做法，最近提出的法规旨在提高透明度，特别是在数字市场。为了了解不透明性何时出现在合同和拟议的法规的潜在影响，我们研究了一个道德风险模型，其中风险中性的主要面临着一个连续的弱风险厌恶代理。代理人在影响委托人收益的可观察特征上有所不同。在描述的合同中，委托人将代理人分成几组，并向每一组传达输出或有支付的分配。在每个小组内，已实现的付款分配必须与所传达的合同一致。如果委托人事先将已实现的合同传达给代理人，则描述合同是透明的，否则它是不透明的。我们提供了一个几何特征的主要的最佳描述的合同以及条件下，最佳描述的机制是透明的和不透明的。我们将我们的研究结果应用于乘车平台上司机支付方案的设计和描述。
英文摘要：
Firms have access to abundant data on market participants. They use these data to target contracts to agents with specific characteristics, and describe these contracts in opaque terms. In response to such practices, recent proposed regulations aim to increase transparency, especially in digital markets. In order to understand when opacity arises in contracting and the potential effects of proposed regulations, we study a moral hazard model in which a risk-neutral principal faces a continuum of weakly risk-averse agents. The agents differ in an observable characteristic that affects the payoff of the principal. In a described contract, the principal sorts the agents into groups, and to each group communicates a distribution of output-contingent payments. Within each group, the realized distribution of payments must be consistent with the communicated contract. A described contract is transparent if the principal communicates the realized contract to the agent ex-ante, and otherwise it is opaque. We provide a geometric characterization of the principal's optimal described contract as well as conditions under which the optimal described mechanism is transparent and opaque. We apply our results to the design and description of driver payment schemes on ride-hailing platforms.
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