用于执行激励的影子得分拍卖
Shadow-score auctions for execution incentives
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中文总结 AI 辅助
本文针对第三方执行者的道德风险问题，提出最优影子得分拍卖机制，对比标准拍卖的差异，并研究得分表示失效时的受约束影子分配机制。
中文摘要 AI 辅助
本文研究的是当分配结果对第三方执行者产生道德风险问题时的最优拍卖机制，执行者在中标者确定前选择努力水平。在常规独立私人价值环境下，最优机制为影子得分拍卖：每个竞标者的虚拟价值会通过其分配状态放松执行者激励约束的影子价值进行调整。与标准得分拍卖不同，该得分源自非竞标者的道德风险约束，而非对质量的偏好。保留格式会错失这一排序渠道，因其仅能调整标的是否售出，无法倾向于更利于激励执行努力的分配状态。本文还探讨了该得分表示失效时的情形，此时最优机制变为受约束的影子分配。
英文摘要
This paper studies optimal auctions in which the allocation creates a moral hazard problem for a third-party executor. The executor chooses effort before the winner is known. In regular independent-private-values environments, the optimal mechanism is a shadow-score auction. Each bidder's virtual value is adjusted by the shadow value of relaxing the executor's incentive constraint using that bidder's allocation state. Unlike standard scoring auctions, the score is derived from a non-bidder's moral hazard constraint rather than from a preference for quality. Reserve formats miss this ranking channel, as they can adjust whether the object is sold, but cannot favor allocation states that are more useful for motivating execution effort. The paper also studies cases in which this scoring representation breaks down and the optimal mechanism becomes a constrained shadow allocation.
