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arXiv 2403.08102econ.TH
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锦标赛拍卖

Tournament Auctions

Luca Anderlini, GaOn Kim

AI总结:

该研究探讨锦标赛式二级价格拍卖中前N名竞标者出价不可更改的规则,发现均衡下其出价高于估值,且当第N+1名竞标者实力较强、N较大时,拍卖期望收益高于标准二级价格拍卖。

摘要:

我们研究了“锦标赛式”二级价格拍卖:N名竞标者竞争参与第二阶段的资格,以与第N+1名竞标者角逐。当前N名竞标者被要求其出价在第二阶段不得更改时,分析得出了一些出人意料的结果。在均衡状态下,前N名竞标者的出价始终高于其自身估值。当第N+1名竞标者实力远强于前N名时,若N较大,过度出价会使拍卖的期望收益高于标准二级价格拍卖。

英文摘要:

We examine ``tournament'' second-price auctions in which $N$ bidders compete for the right to participate in a second stage and contend against bidder $N+1$. When the first $N$ bidders are committed so that their bids cannot be changed in the second stage, the analysis yields some unexpected results. The first $N$ bidders consistently bid above their values in equilibrium. When bidder $N+1$ is sufficiently stronger than the first $N$, overbidding leads to an increase in expected revenue in comparison to the standard second-price auction when $N$ is large.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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