任意类型分布下两人全支付拍卖的显式解

中文摘要 AI 辅助

本文给出了具有非对称分布、独立私有价值的两投标人全支付拍卖（唯一）均衡的显式刻画。该刻画通过将问题重述为其在分位数空间中的等价形式来实现，从而得到仅涉及原始对象的积分和逆的均衡投标函数。无需任何正则性假设：价值分布可以是连续的、离散的、奇异连续的，或这些类型的任意混合。显式公式使比较静态分析变得透明。在一阶随机占优意义上提高某投标人的价值分布，会以相同序提高该投标人的均衡投标分布。对对称投标人模型进行扰动，其收入效应取决于扰动方向：略微削弱两名投标人中的一人会降低预期收入，而略微加强其中一人则具有模糊效应。显式公式还将文献中的一些复杂论证转化为直接推论。

英文摘要

This paper provides an explicit characterization of the (unique) equilibrium of the two-bidder all-pay auction with asymmetrically distributed, independent private values. The characterization is achieved through recasting the problem into its equivalence in the quantile space and thereby obtaining equilibrium bid functions that involve only integrals and inverses of the primitives. No regularity assumption is required: the value distributions can be continuous, discrete, singular continuous, or any mixture of these. The explicit formula makes comparative statics transparent. Raising one bidder's value distribution in first-order stochastic dominance raises that bidder's equilibrium bid distribution in the same order. Perturbing a symmetric-bidder model has different revenue effects depending on the direction of the perturbation: whereas slightly weakening one of the two bidders reduces expected revenue, slightly strengthening one of the two has an ambiguous effect. The explicit formula also turns some involved arguments in the literature into direct corollaries.

发表机构

• University of Western Ontario（韦仕敦大学）

机构由 AI 辅助整理，请以论文原文为准。