arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 2211.12669econ.TH
收藏

模糊厌恶卖方拍卖的收益比较

Revenue Comparisons of Auctions with Ambiguity Averse Sellers

Sosung Baik, Sung-Ha Hwang

摘要:

研究了卖方具有最大最小期望效用偏好的拍卖收益比较问题。卖方持有一组关于某个参考信念的先验知识,这些先验知识被解释为真实概率定律或焦点分布的近似模型。我们开发了一种方法来比较拍卖的收益表现:卖方更喜欢拍卖X拍卖Y,如果他们的传递函数满足弱形式的单交叉条件。直观地说,这个条件意味着投标人的付款与竞争对手在X中的类型比在Y中更负相关。应用这种方法,我们表明,当参考信念是独立同分布(IID)和投标人是模糊中性,(i)第一价格拍卖优于第二价格和全付拍卖,(ii)第二价格和全付拍卖优于消耗战。我们的方法产生的结果相反的联系原则。

英文摘要:

We study the revenue comparison problem of auctions when the seller has a maxmin expected utility preference. The seller holds a set of priors around some reference belief, interpreted as an approximating model of the true probability law or the focal point distribution. We develop a methodology for comparing the revenue performances of auctions: the seller prefers auction X to auction Y if their transfer functions satisfy a weak form of the single-crossing condition. Intuitively, this condition means that a bidder's payment is more negatively associated with the competitor's type in X than in Y. Applying this methodology, we show that when the reference belief is independent and identically distributed (IID) and the bidders are ambiguity neutral, (i) the first-price auction outperforms the second-price and all-pay auctions, and (ii) the second-price and all-pay auctions outperform the war of attrition. Our methodology yields results opposite to those of the Linkage Principle.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

↑