有限承诺动态定价
Dynamic Pricing with Limited Commitment
摘要:
一个垄断者希望在每个时期向一个拥有不断发展和持续的私人信息的消费者出售一件商品。卖方根据到目前为止的历史记录设定每个时期的价格,但不能承诺未来的价格。我们表明,无论持久性程度如何,D1风格细化下的任何均衡都会给卖家带来的收入不高于她提前发布所有价格所获得的收入。
英文摘要:
A monopolist wants to sell one item per period to a consumer with evolving and persistent private information. The seller sets a price each period depending on the history so far, but cannot commit to future prices. We show that, regardless of the degree of persistence, any equilibrium under a D1-style refinement gives the seller revenue no higher than what she would get from posting all prices in advance.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。