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arXiv 2311.00846econ.TH
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从怀疑到忠诚:试用与基于学习的定价

From Doubt to Devotion: Trials and Learning-Based Pricing

Tan Gan, Nicholas Wu

AI总结:

本文研究信息充分的卖家如何通过动态机制销售体验品,提出基于信念差距和买家学习的试用或分级定价机制,并发现消费者数据可能降低卖家均衡收入。

摘要:

一位信息充分的卖家设计一个动态机制来销售体验品。卖家对产品匹配度拥有部分信息,这会影响买家的私人消费体验。我们刻画了这一动态知情委托人问题的均衡机制。知情卖家与不知情买家之间的信念差距,加上买家的学习过程,催生了这样的机制:向持怀疑态度的买家提供有限的产品访问权限,并在买家因良好体验而心动时提供升级选项。根据卖家的筛选技术,这表现为免费或折扣试用或分级定价,这些在数字市场中十分普遍。与静态环境相比,拥有消费者数据反而会降低卖家在均衡中的收入,因为他们利用数据预测买家的学习过程,从而微调动态设计。

英文摘要:

An informed seller designs a dynamic mechanism to sell an experience good. The seller has partial information about the product match, which affects the buyer's private consumption experience. We characterize equilibrium mechanisms of this dynamic informed principal problem. The belief gap between the informed seller and the uninformed buyer, coupled with the buyer's learning, gives rise to mechanisms that provide the skeptical buyer with limited access to the product and an option to upgrade if the buyer is swayed by a good experience. Depending on the seller's screening technology, this takes the form of free/discounted trials or tiered pricing, which are prevalent in digital markets. In contrast to static environments, having consumer data can reduce sellers' revenue in equilibrium, as they fine-tune the dynamic design with their data forecasting the buyer's learning process.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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