信息稳健性下的序贯最优定价
Sequentially Optimal Pricing under Informational Robustness
AI总结:
研究卖方在有限承诺下对买方学习过程不确定时的序贯定价问题,提出序贯最坏情况稳健方法,刻画唯一均衡并证明其利润在任意学习下仍可保证。
摘要:
卖方随时间推移出售一件物品,但不确定买方如何了解其支付意愿。我们在有限承诺下考虑信息稳健性,其中卖方每期提供一个价格,以最大化针对最坏情况学习的预期延续利润。我们的公式序贯地考虑最坏情况。我们在一般条件下刻画了一个本质上唯一的均衡。我们进一步表明,在先验分布的温和条件下,均衡利润与均衡价格路径所保证的利润即使在任意(不受限制的)学习过程下也完全一致。
英文摘要:
A seller sells an object over time but is uncertain how the buyer learns their willingness-to-pay. We consider informational robustness under \textit{limited commitment}, where the seller offers a price \textit{each period} to maximize expected continuation profit against worst-case learning. Our formulation considers the worst case \textit{sequentially}. We characterize an essentially unique equilibrium under general conditions. We further show that, under mild conditions on the prior distribution, the equilibrium profit coincides exactly with the profit guaranteed by the equilibrium price path even under arbitrary (unrestricted) learning processes.
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